Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions

8-11-2010

Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (ING USA ANNUITY AND LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY)
Alice D. Bonner
Superior Court of Fulton County

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Institutional Repository Citation
Bonner, Alice D., "Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ING USA ANNUITY AND LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY)" (2010). Georgia Business Court Opinions. 60.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/60

This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

1.

7

o

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT
STATE OF GEORGIA

ING USA ANNUITY AND L 1 F E ) (
INSURANCE COMPANY and ING
)(
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC, )(
)(

DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY. GA

COP~

)(
Plaintiffs,

)( Civil Action No. 2007-CV-134590

)(
)(
v.

)(

)(
)(
J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC. and )(
DAMIAN BERRY,
)(

)(
Defendants.

)(

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

()

On June 24, 2010, Counsel appeared before the Court to present
argument on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After hearing the
arguments made by counsel, and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion
and the record in the case, the Court finds as follows:
Defendant J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. ("JPMSI") provided investment
banking

service~

to an Australian mining company named Sons of Gwalia

Limited ("Gwalia"). Defendant Damian Berry ("Berry") was an employee of
JPMSI between 1998 and 2002 and was JPMSl's relationship manager for
Gwalia during that time. Starting in 2000, Gwalia decided to raise capital through
the private placement of debt securities. This private placement strategy
occurred over the course of two offerings-the first in the fall of 2000 ("2000
Private Placement") and the second in early 2002 ("2002 Private Placement").
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Plaintiffs lNG-USA Annuity and Life Insurance ("lNG-USA") and ING Investment
Management LLC ("lNG-1M") participated in the 2002 Private Placement. INGUSA, a life insurance company, ultimately purchased $32 million of the notes
offered by Gwalia in the 2002 Private Placement. JPMSI acted as Gwalia's
broker for both the 2000 Private Placement and the 2002 Private Placement and,
among other things, assisted Gwalia in preparing a private placement
memorandum for each offering. In 2004, Gwalia entered into voluntary
administration which is the Australian equivalent of bankruptcy.
Plaintiffs allege that during the 2002 Private Placement, Defendants
misrepresented and concealed Gwalia's true financial picture. In particular,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misrepresented and concealed: (1) Gwalia's

o

investments in derivatives called Indexed Gold Put Options ("IGPOs"), (2)
Gwalia's liquidity crisis following an unauthorized trading spree by Gwalia's
director of finance, and (3) problems with Gwalia's acquisition of another gold
mining company, Pacific Mining Corporation Limited ("Pac Min"). Based on
these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the Georgia Securities
Act of 1973 ("GSA"), common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
violations of the Georgia RICO Act.
Plaintiffs have moved for (1) summary judgment on their claims under the
GSA (2) partial summary judgment against JPMSI on all elements of their
common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims except the amount of
recoverable damages, and (3) partial summary judgment against JPMSI and

(~
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Berry on all elements of their claim under the Georgia RICO Act except the
amount of recoverable damages.
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-56 when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact
remains to be tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of law.
Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991).
In support of their motion for summary judgment on their claim under the
GSA, Plaintiffs argue that they seek the rescission remedy provided by the GSA.
The GSA provides that

(J

It shall be unlawful for any person ... in connection with the offer to
sell, sale, offer to purchase, or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly: (A) to employ a devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (B)
to make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading; or (C) to engage in an act, practice, or course of
business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a
person.
Former O.C.G.A. 10-5-12(a)
The GSA further provides that any person who violates O.C.G.A.
10-5-12(a)
shall be liable to the person buying such security; and such buyer
may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the
consideration paid in cash (or the fair value thereof at the time the
consideration was paid if such consideration was not paid in cash)
for the security with interest thereon from the date of payment down
to the date of repayment as computed in paragraph (1) of
subsection (d) of this Code section (less the amount of any income
received thereon), together with all taxable court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees, upon the tender, where practicable, of
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the security at any time before the entry of judgment, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security.
Former O.C.GA § 10-5-14(a).
Plaintiffs argue that they are pursuing the rescission remedy provided by
O.C.GA § 10-5-14 because lNG-USA still owns the securities in dispute. Based
on that premise, Plaintiffs argue that they should not be required to show
causation because causation is only an essential element of claims seeking
damages, not claims seeking rescission. The Court finds that Plaintiffs'
argument is untenable because they seek a remedy they have no legal right to
pursue. Under Georgia law, rescission is only available in a suit between the
parties to a contract. Sofet v. Roberts, 185 Ga. App. 451, 452 (1988) (because
no privity of contract existed between the parties to the law suit, it was proper for
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the trial court to dismiss that portion of appellant's complaint which sought
rescission). Here, Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Gwalia to buy
securities and JPMSI was the broker for that agreement, not a party to it.
, Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs may not elect the rescission remedy
provided by the GSA, and must pursue only the damages remedy.
The Georgia Court of Appeals has made clear that the essential elements
of a claim brought under O.C.GA § 10-5-12 are the same as those of its federal
counterpart, section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, namely: "(1) a
misstatement or omission, (2) of a material fact, (3) made with scienter, (4) on
which plaintiff relied, (5) that proximately caused his injury." GCA Strategic
Investment Fund, Ltd. v. Joseph Charles & Associates. Inc., 245 Ga. App. 460,
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464 (2000). The Court finds that questions of fact, including whether Defendants'
4

alleged misrepresentations and omissions proximately caused Plaintiffs' injury,
preclude the grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' GSA claim.
Next Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to
liability on their claims for common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
Under Georgia law, "fraud has five elements: (1) false representation by a
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from
acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to the plaintiff."
Bogle v. Bragg, 248 Ga. App. 632, 634 (2001). Negligent misrepresentation has
three elements: "(1) the defendant's negligent supply of false information to
foreseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such persons' reasonable reliance
upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from
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such reliance." Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff. Quade & Douglas, 267
Ga. 424, 426 (1997). The Court again finds that questions of fact, especially as
to scienter on Plaintiffs' fraud claim and reasonable reliance and causation on
both claims, preclude summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to
liability on their claims under the Georgia RICO Act.

In pertinent part, the

Georgia RICO Act makes it unlawful to "acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of
any nature, including money" through a "pattern of racketeering activity."
O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4. A pattern of racketeering activity is defined by the Act in
pertinent part as "[e]ngaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity."
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O.C.G.A. 16-14-3(8). While Defendants argue that the two Private Placements
were merely a single transaction completed over the course of two closings, the
Court disagrees. JPMSI, or its predecessor, was hired on two separate
occasions, as evidenced by two different engagement letters, to conduct the two
separate private placements. The two private placements each had separate
private placement memoranda and different investors. Despite Defendants
arguments, the Court finds that the 2001 Private Placement and the 2002 Private
Placement were not a single transaction. The Court finds that there is evidence
upon which a jury could find that Defendants violated the Georgia RICO Act
based on two predicate acts-misrepresentations and omissions in the private
placement memoranda for both the 2000 Private Placement and the 2002 Private

~

Placement. However, questions of fact as to Defendants' liability preclude

..

summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Georgia RICO claim.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 11th day of August, 2010.

Alice D. Bonner, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Joseph Manning, Esq.
Simon Maiko, Esq.
Donald Loft, Esq.
Jason Eakes, Esq.
MORRIS, MANNING & MARTIN LLP
1600 Atlanta Financial Center
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jmanning@mmmlaw.com
smalko@lmnmlaw.com
dloft@lmnmlaw.com
jeakes@lmmnlaw.col11
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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Norman K. Beck, Esq
Robert Y. Sperling, Esq.
Kyle P. Dejong, Esq.
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